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An Exploration of Jean Francois Lyotard's Theories of Multiplicity of Judgments, Justices and Gods

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Abstract

Judgements and justices: Lyotard believes in multiplicity of judgments and judgments 'without concepts' and criteria (Lyotard 1985, p. 82). To him, in the postmodern world, it should not be any absolute and universal judgement or consensus (Lyotard 1985, p. 82). He thinks that there should be multiplicity of judgments without any fixed criteria and nothing should be considered as the only valid. Lyotard claims, 'without it [universal judgment], there would be no experience of obligation and no problem of justice ... The ability to judge does not hang upon the observance of criteria' (Lyotard 1985, p.17). It is evident that he is against universalism (Lyotard 1988, p. xi), absolutism, dictatorship, conventionalism, cliché, fixed rules and standards. He is rejecting singular criterion for judgment. To Lyotard, because there is no universal judgments and 'impartial judge', 'legitimate judgment' could not be possible (Jefferson 2009, p. 17). He also believes that different judgments are related to different ideas, sets of mind and decisions. He asserts, 'It is the imagining of the effects of what one will decide that will guide the judgment' (1985, p. 65). Lyotard speaks of multiplicity of gods; i.e. there is not merely one God and instead like pagans' beliefs, there are multiple gods; 'paganism has no one god who is removed from the civic, social or philosophical stage, but on the contrary, a multiplicity of gods who swarm over it' (Lyotard 2004, p. Xxi).

Keywords: Jean Francois Lyotard's Theories, Multiplicity of Judgments, Justices and Gods

INTRODUCTION

It is true that each person could have different tastes, beliefs and perceptions, thus for instance for aesthetic judgments, there should not be merely one criterion to call something as beautiful. Lyotard claims that 'If, then, there are conditions of pleasure procured by art, these conditions are not rules a priori that provide norms for taste, they can be nothing more than regularities to be extracted from a multiplicity of judgments given in freedom' (Lyotard 1997, p. 239). Sometimes, one thing that is ugly to one person could be considered as quite beautiful to someone else thus fixed criteria for judging should be changed to multiple criteria or no criteria at all. Lyotard claims that ' One judges not only in matters of truth, but also in matters of beauty (of aesthetic efficacy) and in matters of justice that is, of politics and ethics...' (Lyotard and Thebaud 2008, p. 16). Hence one could freely choose, analyze, evaluate and judge aestheticism, political matters and other issues. Thus, anyone could dare to judge differently and his different judgments and ideas should be tolerated. The researcher argues it is true that because of multiple different notions, perspectives, tastes, preferences and standpoints, there would be multiplicity of judgments and it is not needed to have consensus and global criteria and rules for judgments. This rejects conventions, norms and fixed clichés. It is respect to individual rights and liberty to freely decide and judge according to one's opinions and preferences.

Some critics reject Lyotard's beliefs in the case of multiple judgments with no criteria and they believe that it should be fixed rules for judgment. These critics could be considered as Universalists who think traditionally and believe in rules but it is understandable that Lyotard believes in individual rights and liberty of people to choose, evaluate and judge for themselves. According to Simon Malpas (2003, p.16), postmodernism reveals ' a loss of values and beliefs in present- day society, and the rejection of grounds for making judgments or decisions'. In the actual fact, Lyotard, as a postmodernist, does not reject the value of making judgments and decisions but he rejects universal judgments and instead he (Lyotard 1997, p. 49) respects each individual's right to judge and decide according to his/her own beliefs and opinions. Lyotard asserts, ' In every instance, one must evaluate relations: of force, of values, of quantities, and of qualities; but to evaluate them there are no criteria, nothing but opinions' (Lyotard and Thebaud 2008, p.27), hence opinions are different and there would be multiple evaluations and judgments.

To Lyotard (1985, pp.26-27), any person is allowed to freely evaluate, analyze and judge different values and issues but not according to global fixed criteria. It seems that Lyotard (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985, p. 115) believes universal labels like the concept of good or bad, better or worse, wrong or right are man-made and arbitrary hence these labels should not exist and each person should judge without the universal norm of good or bad, wrong or right and instead he/she should decide and judge autonomously. As a matter of fact, universal labels would potentially limit people and do not allow them to experience for themselves. These global labels merely affect people's perception of right and wrong, and their permission to freely experience. Thus, these labels would impose some ways and attitudes on people and limit their freedom to act and choose the way that they prefer. Hence Lyotard's rejection of fixed and universal criteria and labels would create liberty and freedom for any and every individual.To Lyotard, different language games and aspects of life could not have the same kind of criteria for judgment and it is better that each individual in different positions and circumstances decides and judges for himself. That would be a respect to individual rights and liberty. It would be against conventions and norms of society which establish universal criteria for judgment. As Shahrokh Haghighi (2001, p.36) points out, Lyotard thinks that there are not common criteria for evaluating different activities and institutions of different aspects of life. Lyotard considers different cultural zones like natural sciences, humanism, philosophy, literature, ethics, politics, so on and so forth as different language games. He believes that each cultural

zone has different rules and language games. He maintains that there is no general rule to evaluate and judge different language games; therefore it should not be universal judgment. Thus if there is objection among different language games, there would be no logical criteria for making decision and judgment (Haghighi 2001, pp. 40-41).

METHOD:

Evidently, one of the reasons that Lyotard (1985, p.17) is in favour of pagan world is that pagans do not have one judgment but multiple judgments and prescriptions; Judgments which are not according to fixed criteria but multiple and diverse criteria or as he (1985, p.15) mentions with no criteria and concepts at all. That is against cliché and classical kind of judgment. That would give people freedom to evaluate and judge in the way that they choose and prefer. That would be a sort of freedom of thought, freedom to choose, i.e. choosing not what authorities oblige people to choose, but choosing what each individual likes to choose.

The concept of multiple judgments of Lyotard shows that he is against determinate judgments, because when there are multiple ideas and standpoints, judgments would be different and therefore not determinate. Hence, any kind of judgment, whether political, aesthetic or ethical is indeterminate. The argument of Just Gaming and The Differend is more wide ranging. It consists not merely in resisting the transfer of indeterminate judgments to the political as if they were determinate but also of resisting any determinate judgments in the political sphere. That is to say, the political as a realm of prescriptive, of performance, is not a site for determinate judgment into which aesthetic and ethical judgments must not sneak; the political itself is a realm of indeterminate judgment into which determinate judgments of any kind must not be transferred. Thus the ethical, political and aesthetic are three realms of indeterminate judgment and none must claim to function as a metalanguage, as a ground of determinate knowledge regulating the others (Readings 1991, p.109).

As a matter of fact, Lyotard's notion of multiplicity and diversity of ideas and judgments intends to show that there is no absolute. For instance, if absolutists think that killing others is always wrong, probably Lyotard's idea of multiple ideas and judgments would support the fact that in some situations even murdering should not be labelled or judged as wrong because sometimes murdering is for self- defense when there is an attack or soldiers kill enemies for the sake of defending their country, so on and so forth. Lyotard maintains, 'It is quite clear that there is a great sophistication even as far as what ... 'thou shalt not kill,' admits as exception, and it is considerable' (Lyotard and Thebaud 2008, p.63). Probably Lyotard's notion of multiplicity of judgments without criteria would support that even things that absolutists label as wrong, could be considered as not wrong, it is a matter of situation, time, place or preference. Absolutists and Universalists believe in definite right and wrong but Lyotard tries to demonstrate multiplicity and diversity, and the fact that everything, even our taste and judgment, is subject to change based on the situations. Therefore, it does not seem sufficient to merely stick to one universal standard and there should be multiple choices for multiple situations.

When it is totalitarianism or absolutism, judgments would be fixed and people would not be involved in the processes leading to a consensus on the concept of right and wrong. Furthermore, even in liberal regimes, with a legitimate approach to consensus, people's participation would mainly be in the level of judging authorities' judgement rather than allowing themselves to judge autonomously. Clearly, authorities' judgement, usually built on general rules and regulations, would rather be based upon a broad scale [of issues] which could normally result in dismissing specific facts and situations of an incidence, as opposed to the concept of multiplicity which suggests multiple ideas, judgements and justices. According

to the notion of multiplicity, each individual can judge what just or unjust is rather than concentrating on the judgement of authorities' approach towards just or unjust. When people themselves have freedom to judge whether something is just or unjust, they would participate and evaluate more rather than analyzing or criticizing the fixed judgments of authorities. Therefore it would be respect for every individual's liberty and rights. Lyotard (Lyotard and Thebaud 2008, p.87) states,

The judgment is not absolutely undetermined ... it is presupposed that this idea is the idea of totality. Whereas the problem that faces us, even if it is put in terms of idea and reflective judgment, is that it is no longer a matter, for us, of reflective upon what is just or unjust against the horizon of a social totality, but, on the contrary, against the horizon of a multiplicity or of a diversity.Obviously, all people could not think alike, therefore authorities' judgments could not include everyone's ideas but merely some of them. As a result, diversity of judgments and individual liberty would not be respected in this way and it might lead to dictatorship. On the contrary, Lyotard thinks of acceptance and tolerance of all kinds of judgments of any and every individual. It seems that Lyotard believes judgments should be personal and his idea of multiplicity of judgments would respect individual rights to decide and choose for themselves and this process sounds to be subjective.

Lyotard thinks that it should not be merely one judgment with one universal criterion but it should be multiple judgments because there are multiple people in the world and each of them could have different tastes and preferences hence each of them could judge differently. Lyotard asserts 'judgments pronounced outside of criteria are judgments that are just' (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985, p.26). I believe his idea of multiplicity of judgments is against conventionalism, universalism and absolutism. This notion would support individual liberty, freedom of thought and freedom to choose. According to such notion, all people in the world are not expected to think and judge alike. As an example, if there were merely one criterion for beauty, many things would have been simply listed either as ugly or beautiful, while we know that things which are unaesthetic to one person might be considered as aesthetic to others. To Lyotard (1997, p.239), it should be respect for each individual's judgments and all kinds of different judgments should be treated as having the same worth. Lyotard mentions that 'taste is not determined; then aesthetics cannot be argued, and the sentiment of the beautiful remains plunged in the night of intuition where all judgments are of equal value' (Lyotard 1997, p. 239). It is evident that Lyotard does not think all human beings should take the same path as others. Just because the conventions of society dictate that something is "bad" or "good", "ugly" or "beautiful", "wrong" or "right", we should not believe in it and we should be critical and choose and try out things ourselves. Things that society prescribes as "wrong" might be thoroughly "right" for one who perceives things differently, and vice versa. Therefore, people should have the freedom to allow themselves to try behaviours known as taboo or forbidden as they are not obliged to adhere to established conventions. Such attitude might be considered as immoral or chaotic but it might be worth it because at least one could have the freedom to experience things on his/her own risk. As a matter of fact, what society dictates us is not necessarily right. Judgment is personal and we as individuals could think, evaluate, judge and act freely and differently without considering universal norms and conventions. When society tries to impose universal judgments on people, it could be considered as dictatorship and contradicts individual liberty. Nevertheless, Lyotard's concept of multiplicity of judgments which respects individuals' freedom, shows that there is not any measure for judgment and each individual could subjectively judge for himself/herself.

Lyotard's notion of multiplicity shows that each individual's point of view has equal value to others' and there is no single norm or measure – no ideal – that can be used to label something as better or worse. 'A judgment of taste is not determinant and ... is not objective' (Lyotard 1994, p.19). Apparently, Lyotard criticises idealists because they propound absolute ideals. It seems that Lyotard is committed to neutrality

with respect to judgement, that is, he doubts there are public and universal criteria. To him, these criteria are merely arbitrary norms and conventions.

Lyotard believes in ‘reflective judgment, which does not asses particular cases according to general rules, but, on the contrary, tries to find or even invent those rules each time anew, proceeding from case to case’ (Brons 1995, p. 787). Lyotard believes in ‘a multiplicity of justices, each one of them defined in relation to the rules’. He also believes in ‘the justice of multiplicity’ which is the opposite of ‘universal value’ (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985, p.100). He believes there is not merely one universal justice and rule, but plurality of them. Here I try to show that when Lyotard says that there are multiple justices, he is against the norms of society. He tries to demonstrate that if society shows one justice in each matter, there could be multiple justices and we should not be satisfied with only one universal justice. It could be inferred that he is against absolutism, universalism and conventionalism because he does not believe that there should be solely one established and conventional justice that society sets up, but there should be diversity of justices. Lyotard argues that it is significant to accept 'the idea of a justice that would at the same time be that of a plurality', to have justice not 'under a rule of convergence but rather a rule of divergence' (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985, p.88). He believes in the politics and justices of divergence and differences and that each person could create new rules (Lyotard and Thebaud, p.100). He maintains that when there is not a universal criteria and instead there is a ' multiplicity of small narratives', the real important issue is how to ' distinguish between what is just and what is not just’ (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985, p.88). When there is multiplicity of justices and rules are ranked as having the same value, then society could be called just. Lyotard asserts that 'Every one of us belongs to several minorities, and what is very important, none of them prevails. It is only then that we can say that the society is just' (Lyotard and Thebaud 2008, p.95). Hence it could show that Lyotard is against authorities who think their justice and rule is superior to others and that they have power to decide for people what just or unjust is.

Here there would be a question of whether Lyotard's hypothesis of multiplicity of justices and rules is logical and practical in all aspects or not. One might argue that in the presence of multiple rules and justices, the world could be chaotic and anarchic. Another problem could be the fact that some people might consider things as just or unjust because of their selfishness and personal benefit. It is probable that justice to one person would be considered as cruelty to others hence the hypothesis of multiplicity of justices could be considered as immoral and unethical. One might be hesitant to believe that if there are multiple justices and rules, the world would be really just and utopian. Possibly, Lyotard tries to reject authoritarianism, dictatorship and also universalism of rules. In the actual fact, he tries to show that each person could have free will, individual liberty, freedom of thought and action to establish rules and decide for himself/herself what just or unjust is. Nevertheless, it does not sound completely logical and applicable.

Lyotard is very much concerned about the idea of ‘multiplicity’ which he sometimes uses as synonym of ‘plurality’ and states that ' Can there be then a plurality of justices? Or is the idea of justice the idea of plurality? That is not the same question. I truly believe that the question we face now is that of a plurality, the idea of a justice that would at the same time be that of a plurality, and it would be a plurality of language games' (2008, p.95). Benjamin (2003, p. 60) points out that Lyotard believes that multiplicity should be the principle of justice and judgement, and that universality should be changed to multiplicity. 'The multiplicity of justices (rules) must both depend on the regulative Idea of justice and resist it as itself totalizing' (Benjamin 2003, p. 61). The justice of multiplicity is against the universal value (Lyotard 2008, p. 100). It shows that Lyotard is against universality and totality and instead he tries to embrace differences. He is in favour of pagan justice. He thinks pagans because of having many gods, have

multiple justices and there is not one universal kind of justice but multiple of them; therefore people would have the freedom to think of some issues as just or unjust.

To Lyotard, justice should not be related to knowledge and truth. To him, justice should be related to different ideas and opinions. According to him, each individual probably has different opinions to perceive things as just or unjust. To Lyotard, justice could not be done with models but it should consider possibilities and opinions (Lyotard, Turner and Rojek 1998, p.52). Thus, there should not be universal definition of justice but there should be multiple justices because of multiple perspectives and opinions and this would support individual freedom. To Lyotard, 'continuing to interrogate the question of the just and the unjust' is unjust. 'Justice is, of necessity, open to question, to debate, to suspicion, and to the future' (Lyotard, Turner and Rojek 1998, p.52). It shows that one should not hesitate to ask whether rules are just or unjust in order not to be caught in the trap of dictatorship, absolutism and universalism. Otherwise, it would give right to dictators and men at power to claim that what they are doing and their established rules should be always treated as just and in case of criticising, they would simply refer it as an unjust expression of thought. It shows that authoritative, universal and absolute norms and conventions should not be simply considered as just, according to Lyotard, as we already know that he advocates multiplicity of justices and is against universal just and unjust. When someone, even in the position of authority, considers something as just, it does not mean that for someone else, it should be considered as just and therefore obeyed. 'The obligation which appears in the form of a prescriptive, the authority which prescribes/ commands is not simply to be obeyed' (Rojek, Turner and Lyotard 1998, p.52).

DISCUSSION

As there are multiple ideas and judgments without criteria, it could be inferred that there should not be fixed and universal justices but there could be multiple justices without universal criteria. Hence Lyotard's concept of multiplicity of justices is against universalism, conventionalism and absolutism and Lyotard advocates justices without contract and conventions. It seems that Lyotard is against the repression that commands of conventions would cause. He is in favour of the liberty of individuals and encourages them to institute 'new rules' (Lyotard and Thebaud 2008, p. 61), justices and attitudes rather than the authorisation of a dominant group in establishing such rules, justices and norms. It seems that Lyotard's concept of multiplicity or plurality of justices is not determinate but indeterminate. 'There are no predetermined rules' (Lyotard 1991, p. 15). Each individual's notion of justice could change according to different time or situations and most probably each individual's definition of justice is different from others; hence they are not fixed. We could understand that Lyotard has respect for individuals' rights and liberty. When there are few domineering voices which impose rules and commands, and set and define justices, that all sounds like tyranny, cruelty and dictatorship. However, when there is multiplicity of ideas and each person is free to create his own rules and define his own justices, then there is liberty and freedom. We could understand that Lyotard rejects authorities and dictators who consider their rules as the only just hence he is against dictatorship and single- voicedness.

Respect for an absolute differend between unity and multiplicity, then would only amount to exchanging 'the justice of multiplicity' for 'the multiplicity of justices' that the former was intended to dispel, i.e., to exchanging the prescriptivism behind the justice of multiplicity for the pernicious form of relativism entailed by the multiplicity of justices. We would lose the advantage that Lyotard had hoped to gain for us: a view of radical heterogeneity that could address the political issue of justice and do so in the name of heterogeneity rather than totalitarian or levelling ideas (Silverman 2002, p. 65).

It appears that Lyotard's concept of multiplicity does not support authoritative recommendation or instruction on what to do or what not to do, what to believe in or not to, etc. He (1985, p.18) claims that there is 'neither essence nor necessity' for the existence of prescriptions and absolute rules. In the actual fact, he (1985, p. 27) thinks that each person is his/her own prescriber and even such prescriptions might change according to different circumstances. Therefore, there is no need for consensus and universality of rules and instead each individual could be considered as his/her own ruler and governor. Lyotard claims 'Prescriptives ... cannot be justified; they cannot be made into the conclusions of reasoning; there is no description and no definition of the prescribing authority' (1985, p.63). In a sense, It could be inferred that there is no such necessity for the existence of God, prophets, governors and rulers, in the position of authority, to tell people how to think, what wrong or right is and what they should or should not do. Each person could be his own God or ruler.

In most societies, we are observing absolute rules and there are few individuals at power

who establish rules and people are expected to obey those fixed rules. In these societies, there

is not equality between voices and ideas of individuals and voice of authorities and men at

power would have privilege to others. Therefore, the notion of multiplicity and equality of

diversities have not become widely applicable yet. On the other hand, absolute rules and

regulations are still practised in most societies.

Gods: Lyotard speaks of multiplicity of gods; i.e. there is not merely one God and instead like pagans' beliefs, there are multiple gods; 'paganism has no one god who is removed from the civic, social or philosophical stage, but on the contrary, a multiplicity of gods who swarm over it' (Lyotard 2004, p. Xxi). Lyotard himself is not sure of existence of multiple gods but prefers the notion of multiple gods to one absolute God who must be obeyed by people. It seems that when there is merely one god, people are more limited and obliged to accept certain sorts of rules but when there are multiple gods, each individual would have more freedom to choose between multiple options. Hence Lyotard's notion of multiplicity of gods is more liberal than the idea of monism which imposes specific kinds of rules on people. James Williams states that 'In Libidinal Economy [of Lyotard], this encounter is given through the pagan gods said to preside over the sexual act. Lyotard wishes to argue, against Saint Augustine's argument in favour of one God...There is not the one Christian God but many, pagan, gods' (1998, p.49). Lyotard who is hesitant of existence of multiple gods claims that 'it cannot be known whether the gods exist or not, nor what they are of they do exist' (Lyotard 1988, p. 20). Lyotard is against the beliefs of Christians, absolutists and the ones who believe in a perfect and ideal Superiod power who creates everything and must be obeyed by all. It would show that he is against absolute power of Superior power or authorities, and instead he believes in individual freedom. And in the case of preferring multiple gods to the Christian Superior power he claims,

What is important in the case of Greeks is that their gods are not masters of the word in the sense in which the Christian God is a master of the word, that is, their word is not performative as the word of the Christian God is. It does not create the world, nor does it create any of the situations of the world, even though a given god may have such a power, in an oracle, for example. (Lyotard 1985, p, 39)

Lyotard prefers dominant authorities not to give orders or establish rules, he prefers them to be mute hence we could say that he prefers individual freedom rather than authoritarianism. Dominant authority's power is higher than our freedom but existence of multiple gods would at least help people to choose which rules to follow rather than one universal law of one absolute God. Lyotard who advocates the idea of multiple gods of pagans asserts, 'I have no criteria; here we don't say, so and so is pagan but, let us be pagan' (1985, p. 18). When there are multiple superior powers, there would not be merely one sets of rules but multiple sets of rules and people could freely choose among them and Lyotard even claims,

The relation with the gods, including the pragmatic relation of discourses, does not obey a pragmatics of border to border, between the two perfectly defined blocks or two armies, or two verbal sets, confronting each other. On the contrary, it is a place of ceaseless negotiations and rules. Which means that there is no reference by which to judge the opponent's strength; one does not know if s/he is a god or a human. It is a beggar, but it may be a god, since the other is metamorphic, and one will have to judge therefore by opinion alone, that is, without criteria. (Lyotard 1985, p. 43)

It could be comprehended that relationship of people and gods are not like

the relationship of people to the absolute God who has the enormous power and should be unquestioningly obeyed. Lyotard believes that even people sometimes would not recognize if someone is human or super power. Lyotard is against the notion that God is absolute and instead he emphasizes on pagan and multiple superior powers who are not even distinguishable from human beings and even their existence is not completely valid. Lyotard asserts,

These stories have no origin. They treat origins in terms of stories that presuppose other stories that in turn presuppose the first ones. And so the gods can become, like human beings, like Ulysses, the heroes of numerous, almost innumerable, narratives, all set into each other. They become like a species of proper names whose corresponding bodies change. In some respects, this is a sort of pagan ideal that occurs again and again in various forms, including in the religions of the late Roman Empire (Lyotard 1985, p. 40).

Lyotard thinks that each person could have freedom to choose whether to believe in the existence of god(s) or not and it would show that he is against obligation and dictatorship. He (Lyotard1996, p.21) claims, the gods are taken for addressees. 'No man who believes in gods as the law would have him believe can of his own free will do unhallowed deed or let slip lawless discourse. If a man acts this, it is because he is the victim of affection (paschon), of which there are three kinds. Either, as I say, he does not believe, or again, he believes that they are, but are heedless of mankind, or lastly, that they are lightly to be won over by the cajoling of offerings and prayers' (Laws x 885 b).

To Lyotard, ' Postmodern society is 'pagan' (Benjamin 2003, pp. 31). Multiplicity of superior powers would reject obligation of obedience of global and fixed rules, thus it would reject universalism. Lyotard maintains, ' The pagan is simply the idea of society, that is, ultimately, of a set of diverse pragmatics (a set that is neither totalisable nor countable, actually). The specific feature of this set would be the fact that the different language games that are caught up in the pagan universe are incommunicable to each other. They cannot be synthesised into unifying metadiscourse' (Lyotard and Thebaud 2008, p.58). This idea of Lyotard, demonstrates differences but is it ideal to have a pagan society without communication of different language games? Differences are acceptable but when they are too much different that they could not be communicable, it does not sound utopian.

There is contradiction in Lyotard's idea of paganism because most of the times he speaks of multiplicity of gods, but in his interview with Andrew. E. Benjamin he claims that 'When I say 'pagan', I mean godless. And the reason why we (you, not me) need to be taught a lesson is that we still want justice. That is the point of my instructive story: justice in a godless society' (Lyotard and Benjamin 1998, p.123).

It could be comprehended that he means when there are multiplicity of gods and people could choose among gods' diverse and multiple rules and laws, there would actually be no superior power and people are searching and choosing among diverse laws to choose their preferable one. Probably when he is speaking of godless world he is speaking of no single universal and absolute God but in fact, it is contradiction between multiplicity of superior powers and godless world. It seems, however, that Lyotard steers the path towards the godless world through a world of multiple gods.

CONCLUSION

Conclusion. In this research, it is demonstrated that the concept of multiplicity of Lyotard rejects universalism, absolutism, idealism, totalitarianism, conventionalism and dictatorship. It has been elaborated that this concept tries to shape a free world with respect to individuals' rights and liberty with tolerance of differences. It is argued that the notion of multiplicity of Lyotard wants to create a postmodern world with freedom of thought, speech and action for any and every individual.

Lyotard's theories of multiplicity of judgments, justices and gods show that in the utopian postmodern world of Lyotard, differences are accepted and respected. It is argued that Lyotard's concept of multiplicity tries to picture a free and liberal postmodern world which gives complete liberty to any and every individual to think, speak and behave differently. It is claimed that Lyotard's multiplicity which advocates individual liberty rejects universalism, absolutism, idealism, totalitarianism, conventionalism and dictatorship.

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