A Structural Model of Power Distribution and Its Impact on Policy Outcomes in Authoritarian and Democratic Regimes

Abstract

The paper discusses how power distribution affects the policy results of authoritarian and democratic governments. The research constructs a structural model to investigate the effects of centralised versus decentralised power on the quality of governance, policy responsiveness, and effectiveness. Using a comparative research design, the analysis employs regression and agent-based modelling techniques to rank power structures across different regimes, with key policy outcomes including responsiveness, rapid implementation, and inclusiveness. The results indicate that in authoritarian regimes where power is highly centralised (centrality measure = 0.85), policy implementation is quicker (9.5), but less responsive (5.4) and inclusive (4.3). Conversely, more decentralised (centrality measure = 0.45) democratic regimes are more policy-inclusive (8.2) and policy-responsive (8.2) but slower in the execution speed (6.2). The regression results indicate significant associations between power concentration and the following policy outcomes: decentralised regimes exhibit better responsiveness and inclusivity, whereas centralised regimes exhibit higher implementation speed and faster decision-making (p < 0.05). The paper highlights the need to balance power in political systems to achieve effective governance and optimal policy outcomes. The findings imply that both types of regimes should consider reforms that guarantee inclusivity without compromising the effectiveness of the policy implementation.